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Spinoza and Musical Power  
Marie Thompson  
 
Abstract  
In recent years there has been a growing body of scholarship that seeks to use 
Spinozist concepts to theorize musical experience. However, very little of 
Spinoza’s work explicitly considers music. In one of the few places in which 
musical experience is discussed in Spinoza’s Ethics, it is used as a means of 
exemplifying the ways in which an entity, in itself, is not ‘good or evil’: it is 
neither, or both, depending on the relations into which it enters with other 
bodies. Drawing upon Spinzoa’s remarks, in this article, I consider what a 
Spinozist theory of musical power might entail. I argue that the particular, 
immanent and materialist notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ that can be found in 
Spinoza’s work and are exemplified via music, enable a departure from both 
‘aesthetic moralism’ and ‘aesthetic relativism’. With reference to 
contemporary discourses of musical violence, as well as Pauline Oliveros’ 
praxis of Deep Listening, I assert that Spinoza makes space for music’s ethico-
affective ambivalence. Drawing attention to Spinoza’s citation of deaf 
experiences of music, I also consider the extent to which a Spinozist model of 
musical power allows for ‘auraldiversity’. In doing so, I aim to demonstrate 
the ways in which musical experience might exemplify some of the key tenets 
of Spinoza’s thought.   
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Power lies at the heart of Spinoza’s work: it connects his ontology, ethics, politics, 
physics and epistemology. Just as the Spinozist God/Nature is power (potentia), the 
essence of the Spinozist mode (or body-mind) is a degree of God/Nature’s infinite 
power (conatus). The Spinozist good life, which involves becoming closer to God, 
involves a maximization of the body-mind’s powers for thought and action. Yet a 
mode’s degree of power is in flux. Encounters with other entities may increase the 
power of a body and its mind or diminish its power, rendering it reactive. Power, for 
Spinoza, is thus both the essence of a mode and determined via its relations with 
other modes.    
 
In this article, I use a framework developed from Spinoza’s Ethics to pursue a 
particular understanding of musical power. To talk of the power of music risks 
evoking romantic imaginations of music’s capacity to traverse cultural boundaries 
and to inexplicably move us. Contrary to many of these dominant tropes, the 
philosophy of Spinoza provides a way of understanding musical power that neither 
universalises music’s benefits nor simply resorts to relativism. Musical power has 
also been commonly understood apropos of political institutions, as well as music’s 
ability to transmit ideologies. While Spinoza does not necessarily require us to 
depart with such understandings of musical power, the materialist notion of power 
deployed here is primarily framed in relation to the body and its capacities. 
 
I begin by distinguishing a particular Spinozist conception ‘good and bad’, which 
are descriptors of power relations between entities. I differentiate this from both the 
proscriptive imaginary of aesthetic moralism as well as an aesthetic relativism 
predicated on personal taste. Taking up a brief comment by Spinoza on music in 
The Ethics I aim to exemplify how Spinoza’s notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ might be 
applied to musical experience. By reading Suzanne Cusick’s account of musical 
torture via Spinoza’s ontology, I outline a Spinozist notion of musical harm; and 
examine what good music and good listening might do in the context of Spinoza’s 
ontological and ethical framework. Finally, insofar as Spinoza gestures towards to 
deaf encounters with music, I ask how a Spinozist conception of musical power 
might allow for differences in aural capacities, considering the ways in which 
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Spinozist framework enables a departure from a model predicated on an ideal 
listener. In doing so, I hope to show how Spinoza’s thought might be useful for 
understanding musical experience, while also showing how musical experience 
might exemplify Spinozist philosophy.   
 
Spinoza and music  
As has been frequently noted, the fine arts gain little attention in Spinoza’s work. In 
his essay ‘Why Spinoza Had No Aesthetics’ James Morrison describes Spinoza’s 
brief comments on art and beauty as having ‘no great philosophical significance or 
originality’ when taken separately, ‘and taken together they can in no way be 
construed as having even the rudiments of an aesthetic theory.’1 Indeed, Spinoza 
offers little that might be described as a thesis on music, certainly by comparison to 
his counterpart René Descartes. The earliest yet often overlooked work of Descartes 
is the Musicae Compendium of 1618. In this short treatise Descartes outlines a 
series of hypotheses on music, considering the relationship between physical and 
mental dimensions of sensory perception. The text is a reflection of the changing 
seventeenth-century perspectives on music, with the development of a scientific 
method of resonance, consonance and musical affect.   
 
In spite of his lack of attention to music and artistic practices more generally, 
Spinoza has also come to be associated with music via secondary readings– perhaps 
most famously through the work Deleuze and Guattari. Moreover, with the growing 
body of Deleuzian music studies scholarship, Spinozist concepts have been brought 
into relationship with music, providing an alterative means to understand 
performing and listening bodies.2 Amy Cimini, meanwhile, has utilised Spinoza’s 
parallelism to critique the residual dualism of anti-Cartesian music studies and to 
provide an account of embodied musical ethics.3 As this growing body of 
scholarship suggests, there is much in Spinoza’s work that can be fruitfully applied 
to musical experience despite his status as a non- or anti-aesthetic thinker. 
 
In one of the rare occasions in which Spinoza himself mentions music, it is used as 
a means of exemplifying the ways in which an entity, in itself, is not ‘good or evil’. 
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Rather, Spinoza understands these terms as descriptions of a particular set of 
relations. In The Ethics, he writes:  
As far as good and evil are concerned, they…indicate nothing positive in 
things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of 
thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another. For 
one and the same thing can, at the same time, be good and bad, and also 
indifferent. For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for 
one who is mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf.4  
In this brief passage, Spinoza outlines what might be described as a ‘functional’ 
description of music. For Spinoza, music is a technology of affective modulation 
that, in turn, may be described as good or as bad, depending on the disposition and 
resulting state of the affected listening mode. In this regard, judgements of good and 
bad, beauty and ugliness do not pertain to the innate qualities of aesthetic objects. 
Rather, they are a reflection of determinable and contextual effects.  From the 
perspective of the listener experiencing melancholy, music is experienced as good; 
and yet, if melancholy turns to grief, this music might be experienced as bad. 
‘Good’ and ‘bad’ tell us nothing about the nature of the music itself, beyond its 
affective capacities situated within a particular set of relations. They do, however, 
tell us something about the affected listener.    
 
In recognising the ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ of entities as a relational effect, 
Spinoza radically departs from Pythagorean and Platonic cosmologies, which 
understand music to offer an approximation of divine harmonic ratios. As Amy 
Cimini notes, Spinoza’s ontology of a divine nature results in a rejection of the 
European musical approaches that are likely to have dominated his historical 
moment, whereby musical virtuosity was recognised in relation to a transcendental 
order or an anthropomorphised god whose pleasure is analogous to our pleasure.5 
Indeed, Spinoza warns against mistaking sensations of harmony and noise with the 
affirmation of a transcendental order, chastising ‘the ignorant’ for confusing their 
affections with ‘the chief attributes of things’:   
The ignorant…believe all things to have been made for their sake, and call the 
nature of a thing good or bad, sound or rotten and corrupt as they are affected 
by it.…Those which move the senses through the nose, they call pleasant, 
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smelling or stinking, through the tongue, sweet, bitter, tasty or tasteless, 
through touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth and the like; and finally, those 
which move the ears are said to produce noise, sound or harmony. Men have 
been so mad as to believe God is pleased by harmony. Indeed, there are 
philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the motions of the heavens 
produce harmony.6   
The confusion that Spinoza identifies as arising between modal experiences of sonic 
pleasure or displeasure and the definitive properties of sound or music has been 
fundamental to what I have described elsewhere as ‘aesthetic moralism’. Aesthetic 
moralism is a proscriptive imaginary that organises the relationship between silence 
and noise, defining them as good and bad, wanted and unwanted, beneficial and 
harmful respectively. It involves the conflation of what is perceived as aesthetic 
virtue with moral virtue: sounds that are heard as desirable and pleasing are thought 
to have social and intellectual worth, whereas sonic qualities deemed ugly and 
unpleasant are considered markers of social and cultural decline and prohibited 
accordingly.7 A similar aesthetic moralism can be understood to organise 
relationships between various forms of music, in conjunction with social and 
political hierarchies. Classical music, for instance, has been posited as having 
absolute and universal significance. The universality attributed to classical music 
has been reinforced by a popular imagination of classical music as a ‘civilizing’ 
force: classical music’s status as ‘great art’ make it socially and morally valuable, 
hence its inclusion in a number of education and outreach programmes.8 In the field 
of popular music studies, meanwhile, the rock music of the Beatles, the Rolling 
Stones and other canonical figures have historically been considered aesthetically 
and morally virtuous by comparison to the insipid, feminized and ‘fake’ pop music: 
where the former is an ‘authentic’ mode of expression, the latter is often 
characterised derivative, unintellectual and disposable.  
 
Spinoza’s remark about music’s capacity to be good and bad might be read as a 
reassertion of the oft-cited claim that music is ‘a matter of personal taste’. An 
aesthetic moralism is thus replaced with an aesthetic relativism: musical goodness 
and badness becomes an issue of individual preference. However, the particular 
notion of the individual or subject (or lack thereof) in Spinoza’s work complicates 
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such attempts to read his discussion of judgement as an affirmation of personal 
taste. In Part III of The Ethics Spinoza asserts that: ‘we neither strive for, nor will, 
neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary we 
judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it.’9 
It is reiterated that the judgement of an entity as good or bad is an effect not a cause. 
We do not strive for what is good; rather we label as good what we strive for. 
Likewise, to understand musical judgements as originating from personal taste – or 
to understand personal taste as being derived from the autonomous judgement and 
free will of an individual – reflects an inadequate understanding of causality. To 
identify personal taste and preference as the cause of pleasant and unpleasant 
experiences with music is to fail to recognise the ways in which ‘the individual’ and 
its encounters are situated within and determined by a myriad of past and present 
affective relations. For Spinoza, all material entities – including hearing humans and 
musical sounds – are modes pertaining to the same substance. What a human body 
can do and a sine wave can do radically differ and yet they are, ontologically 
speaking, part of the same whole. Spinoza’s parallelism, meanwhile, means that ‘a 
mode of Extension and the idea of that mode are one of the same thing, expressed in 
two ways’.10 The body as a mode of Extension – a composite of relations of motion 
and rest with the capacity to affect and be affected – and mind as an idea of the 
body pertain to two attributes (extension and thought) of the same substance. They 
are finite manifestations of an infinite, immanent and monist God/nature. 
Consequently, in Spinoza’s work there is an irreducibly social conception of 
existence. A mode’s relations with other modes, as well as its history of encounters, 
are constitutive of its powers of thought, action and affection.  
 
The conflation of Spinoza’s remarks on music with an aesthetic relativism is also 
problematic insofar of a particular Spinozist conception of good and bad can be 
distinguished from the ‘relativist’ good and bad of personal taste. For Spinoza, 
individuals tend to call good or bad that which they believe will be beneficial or 
harmful, pleasurable or unpleasant to themselves. Good and bad are thus ‘subjective 
and modal.’11 However, these terms also act as descriptors of relations between 
modes – in this instance, between the resonant body of music and melancholic or 
grieving listener – that results in a modulation of bodily power. In this regard, good 
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and bad might not be ‘merely subjective’. Rather, in naming the fluctuations of the 
mode’s powers for action, thought and understanding, as determined by its relations 
with other entities, good and bad can be understood to have a ‘primary, objective 
meaning, but one that is relative and partial.’12 From this perspective, music that is 
bad pertains to an encounter that diminishes the body’s power, whereas good music 
would entail an enhancement of a body’s powers.  
 
To recognise that music’s ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ can be understood as relational 
and contextual is, of course, not a particularly remarkable observation. Simon Frith, 
for example, has argued that while it remains integral to musical aesthetics and 
notions of musical pleasure, ‘there is no such thing as bad music. Music only 
becomes bad in an evaluative context, as part of an argument.’13 However, 
discussions of music’s relative merits and flaws tend to refer to music’s discursive 
and symbolic components; and its comparative successes and failures apropos of 
ideal models of musical practice. While a Spinozist approach does not necessarily 
require an abandonment of these perspectives, it begins from a different starting 
point in asking ‘what do musical bodies (and their ideas) do?’ By taking into 
consideration this definition of good and bad as referring to modulations in a 
mode’s power; and situating Spinoza’s comments about music in relation to his 
monist ontology and ethical project, a space opens up for a Spinozist understanding 
of musical power that is distinct from both aesthetic moralism and relativism in its 
approach. This rests on an understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ that is defined via 
music’s intervention in material relations. In order to further develop this, I draw 
upon the three different encounters with music that Spinoza identifies (good, bad, 
indifference). I outline a Spinozist account of ‘musical harm’, identifying music’s 
capacity to diminish a mode’s capacity for thought and action. I then discuss what 
good music and, by extension, good listening does from a Spinozist perspective. 
Finally, in light of Spinoza’s reference to deafness and his characterisation of deaf 
musical experiences, I evaluate how a Spinozist conception of musical experience 
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Spinoza and musical harm  
In his essay on the tensions between Spinozist and aesthetic thought, James 
Morrison asserts that that the arts, for Spinoza, have a ‘merely instrumental’ value, 
insofar as they serve to maintain the body. In Part IV of the Ethics, Spinoza lists 
music, alongside pleasant food and drink, sports, theatre, scents and the beauty of 
plants as means by which the wise can refresh and restore themselves.14 It is 
important to note that Morrison’s assessment rests in part on his treatment of reason 
and passion in Spinoza as oppositional: as shall be discussed further in the 
following section, such a dualist reading obscures the complex interweaving of 
these components in Spinoza’s thought. For Morrison, the role afforded to the arts 
within a Spinozist paradigm is an ‘auxiliary one of maintaining bodily health.’15 
However, in using music as an exemplar by which good and bad indicate nothing 
with regards to the nature of an entity, Spinoza makes apparent the possibility for 
music (and indeed the arts more broadly) to not just maintain but also diminish 
bodily health or power. The potential for encounters with art to be harmful, 
however, remains largely absent from Morrison’s account.16   
 
For Spinoza, a bad encounter is one that results in a diminishment of power for an 
affected body and its parallel mind; and is associated with the passion of sadness. 
Bad encounters prevent us from approaching our ‘nature’: they are a marker of 
incompatibility between bodies. Evil, illness and death all pertain to the 
incompatible relations between bodies, such as poisoning, intoxication and 
deterioration. By this reasoning, ‘bad’ music is that which diminishes the power of 
the body and its mind. Spinoza’s example – music is bad for the grieving listener – 
suggests that music is incompatible with a person in grief, further diminishing its 
capacity of action and thought and therefore resulting in sadness. If the grieving 
listener attempts to use music to alleviate their affective state, they do so without 
understanding the incompatibility between themselves and music.     
 
The notion that music might be harmful, negative or damaging has a long history. 
Plato’s meditations on the uses of proper musical education, for example, involve 
identifying virtuous and dangerous musical attributes of rhythm and harmonic 
mode. For Plato, musical training is a ‘more potent instrument than any other, 
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because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on 
which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul of him who is 
rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated ungraceful’.17 Music’s 
influence on the soul makes it both potentially beneficial and dangerous. In Book III 
of The Republic, it is stated that the harmonies expressive of sorrow – namely, the 
Lydian mode – were to be banished: ‘even to women who have a character to 
maintain they are of no muse, and much less to men. Certainly.’18 Complex 
rhythms, scales and ‘many-stringed curiously harmonised’ instruments were not to 
be admitted into the State inasmuch as they are not expressions of a courageous and 
harmonious life, while the flute-makers and players were to be excluded for their 
composite use of harmony. As with Spinoza, then, Plato’s music may have 
beneficial and diminishing effects on the individual and the composite body of the 
social. However, as has been already noted, Spinoza and Plato remain ontologically 
estranged from one another: Spinoza’s ontology of immanence marks a significant 
departure from a Platonic cosmology. Furthermore, Plato and Spinoza’s ‘bad music’ 
differ in light of their distinct conceptions of the body-mind relation. For Plato, 
music affects the soul, whereas for Spinoza, music’s body and its idea affect the 
listener and its idea.     
 
In spite of this long history, scholars have at times struggled to account for music’s 
capacity to harm. Investments in music (and indeed art more broadly) as a virtuous 
medium – as, for example, an expression of exceptional human creativity, 
fundamental to the wellbeing of the individual and society  – can also inhibit 
evaluations of music’s detrimental affects and effects. In their work on popular 
music and violence, Martin Cloonan and Bruce Johnson note that there is often a 
‘tacit assumption that…music is inevitably personally and socially therapeutic.’19 
Similarly, considering the use of music as a mechanism of torture within American 
detention camps during the ‘War on Terror’, Suzanne Cusick notes how the 
powerful fiction of music’s innate moral worth is called into question:    
‘We in the so-called West have long since come to mean by the word 
‘music’ an acoustical medium that expresses the human creativity, 
intelligence and emotional depth that, we think, almost lifts our animal 
selves to equality with the gods. When we contemplate how ‘music’ 
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has been used in the detention camps of contemporary wars, we find 
this meaning stripped away. We are forced, instead, to contemplate 
‘music’ as an acoustical medium for evil. The thing we have revered 
for an ineffability to which we attribute moral and ethical value is 
revealed as morally and ethically neutral – as just another tool in 
human beings’ blood-stained hands.’20  
Where music studies and philosophy alike have often celebrated music as beneficial 
for both the individual mind and the social collective, the use of music as a means 
of diminishing the power of detainees is revelatory of music’s capacity for harm. 
Cusick highlights how pop music and the music from children’s television shows 
has been weaponized to torture detainees in Abu Ghriab and Guantanamo in order 
to diminish a captive’s subjectivity and sense of self. Combined with other ‘no-
touch’ torture practices, the use of music as acoustic bombardment provided a 
means of overpowering and rendering passive the listening body and its mind.    
 
For Cusick, such practices reveal the ethical neutrality of music. Following Spinoza, 
however, enables an alternative assessment. Music is not ethically neutral; rather, 
the nature of relations determines its ethical status. However, it is important to ask 
what precisely is meant by music in such contexts. As has already been noted, from 
a Spinozist perspective, is no substantial specificity to sonic or musical 
materialities. Where different bodies have different capacities, Spinoza’s monism 
means that the arts cannot be distinguished ontologically from any other mode. 
Furthermore, just as affect is never ‘just affect’, insofar as it is entangled with ideas, 
imaginations and sensations; and a body’s power is never just ‘its’ power, insofar as 
it is at least partly defined by its relations with other bodies; music is never ‘just 
music’, insofar as it pertains to ordered sounds. Music or musical events might be 
best understood as complex bodies, consisting of, amongst other things, sounds and 
sound-making devices, resonant spaces, mediating technologies and ideologies. 
Music’s affective capacity and thus, by extension, it’s capacity to be good or bad 
depends on the nature of these component relations. In the detention centres of the 
‘War on Terror’, musical torture is reported to take place in highly reverberant 
shipping containers at high volumes and played at inconsistent period. In this 
regard, ‘bad’ music is determined as such not only through the relation between 
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sonic materials and listening body: rather, a whole host of social, political, material 
and ideal forces mediate this relation. Indeed, one aspect of these practices that have 
drawn frequent comment from Cusick and popular commentators has been the 
curatorial decisions made in these contexts. If, as former detainees have remarked, it 
‘doesn’t sound like music at all?’ then why are particular types of music – often 
feminized pop and children’s music – used?21   
 
It would appear that these musical choices serve to reinforce social fictions that 
organise relations of ‘us’ and ‘them’, that is, complex bodies of affects and ideas 
that are real but imagined. These social fictions, which present the racialised body 
of ‘the enemy’ as simultaneously primitive, childlike, effeminate and misogynistic, 
can be understood to both underline and be reinforced by the curatorial decisions 
made by military personnel.22 As Cusick notes: ‘A false sense of self-possession 
comes to compound a series of racial and cultural prejudices that reinforce the 
otherness of the victim, leading to a false feeling of enhanced masculinity (“I can 
take it and they can’t”) or enhanced modernity.’23 Thus while music in such 
contexts might be experienced by the diminished body-mind of the detainee as sheer 
and blunt physical force, it nonetheless remains entangled with questions of socio-
musical identities and their histories.  
 
The use of music as torture can be understood as one, albeit ‘extreme’, 
manifestation of Spinozist bad music. Yet in more ‘mundane’ contexts, too, music’s 
capacity to diminish a body’s power can be exemplified. This might include 
experiences of ‘aural fatigue’ from unending music in the workplace, with which 
listeners may become uncomfortable, tired and distracted; the aggravation of 
tinnitus through particular musical frequencies might diminish the capacity of the 
body of the ear; or the use of classical music as an irritating audio-affective 
deterrent in order to prevent ‘undesirable’ composite social bodies from loitering.24 
It might even include the ways in which music, via increasingly personalised 
distribution technologies, serves to reinforce imaginations of neoliberal subjectivity 
and its investments in individual freedom, autonomy and self-improvement. While 
the use of music as torture refutes common narratives around the medium’s 
universal virtue, these seemingly more quotidian examples also matter inasmuch as 
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they inhibit dismissals of music’s diminishment of a mode’s power as an exception 
to the norm. Contra the positivity of music studies’ discourse, they suggest negative 
encounters with music are far from uncommon: they are, instead, part of ‘the 
everyday’.   
 
What does good music (and listening) do?  
By comparison to ‘bad’ music, ‘good’ music might appear somewhat more difficult 
to identify. Indeed, for Spinoza, many encounters are destined to be bad – to 
diminish a body’s power and to result in confused ideas. Yet Spinoza’s brief remark 
on music’s lack of inherent value clearly gestures toward the capacity for music to 
be ‘good’. For Morrison, this ‘goodness’ can only be interpreted as referring to arts’ 
therapeutic capacity: art’s alignment with the passions means that it is excluded 
from the development of a reasoned good life.   
 
For Spinoza, however, there are different forms of good encounter that need to be 
taken into consideration. Good encounters determine a shift from a position of 
lesser to greater power. This is associated with joy. However, joy can be passive, or 
reactive, insofar as it is determined by ‘chance’ encounters and external forces that 
are not properly understood; but it can also be ‘active’, insofar as it marks the shift 
from inadequate toward more adequate ideas. As Michael Hardt notes, the Spinozist 
ethical question falls in two parts: How can we come to produce active affections? 
But first of all, how can we come to experience a maximum of joyful passions?25  
 
Where Morrison sees art as excluded from this process, becoming active is not 
achieved through avoiding or minimizing the passions but through understanding 
them: through becoming aware of the body, and what it can do, the ways in which it 
affects and is affected via its relations with other bodes: how the body and its mind 
are part of a composite body. In other words, becoming active involves knowing the 
body and its determining relations. Moreover, becoming increasingly active – or 
becoming increasingly ‘self-aware’ as Genevive Lloyd defines it – requires a 
recognition that the individual mode does not exist in isolation as a self-contained 
and autonomous whole.26  
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Becoming aware of the body and its relations is common to much musical practice. 
Indeed, for many performers it is all too clear how the notion of the free-willing 
musicking subject versus the passive musical object inadequately reflects the 
practice and process of music making. To effectively perform requires an 
understanding not only of one’s own body and its capacities (of motion, breath, 
duration) as partly determined by its relationship with other bodies (for example, 
flute, microphone, laptop) but also an understanding of the of the influence of the 
wider milieu. The oboist’s tuning and timbre, for example, is determined in part by 
atmospheric pressure and architectural factors  – how an ‘A’ reverberates in one 
space is not the same as how it reverberates elsewhere and so the player must learn 
how to adapt to different environments. In addition to this ‘physical’ basis of 
practice, there is the embodiment of histories and conventions of performance that 
partly determine how instruments are held, engaged with and, by extension, 
subverted. Through understanding the relationships that constitute the musical event 
– between performing bodies, instruments, environments, sounds and histories – 
performers can move toward a reasoned practice. Musicianship might thus be 
thought of as resting on the development of bodily awareness – of not only the 
capacity of the body and what it can and cannot do; but also what it can and cannot 
do in composition with other bodies. This knowledge shapes and is shaped by future 
practice.   
 
Where musical performance requires self-awareness of the body, its powers and its 
limits, it remains pertinent to ask how musical listening might also facilitate a move 
toward self-awareness, toward activity, toward joy. As Amy Cimini has 
demonstrated, a Spinozist paradigm can offer an opportunity through which to 
rethink common characterisations of listening as ‘passive’. Where dominant 
imaginations of the ear’s ‘openness’ lead to descriptions of sonic experience in 
terms of passivity and immersion, ‘Spinoza’s univocal conception of activity and 
passivity unsettles the historically normative allocation of passivity to the ear in 
both musical and ethical domains. The Spinozistic body does not arrive, a priori, 
with zones of activity and passivity distributed across its materiality.’27 In this 
regard, the composer Pauline Oliveros’ program of Deep Listening might provide 
one means of ‘becoming active’ in listening. While grounded in a rather different 
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set of philosophical questions, some complementary resonances can be traced 
between Oliveros’ practice and the Spinozist pursuit of joyous bodily-awareness.   
 
Oliveros’ work centres on developing the art of listening, recognising this as an 
often side-lined but nonetheless integral component of both musical engagement 
and social transformation. For Oliveros, Deep Listening marks an attempt to move 
beyond the habits of listening and knowing. The Deep Listening Institute describes 
the practice as an exploration of the differences between ‘involuntary’ hearing and 
‘voluntary’ listening, and the ‘selective nature – exclusive and inclusive – of 
listening.’ It includes techniques such as ‘bodywork, sonic meditations, interactive 
performance, listening to the sounds of daily life, nature, one’s own thoughts, 
imaginations and dreams, and listening to listening itself’ with the aim of cultivating 
‘a heightened of and movement between these awareness of the sonic 
environment.’28 In drawing attention to listening as body-mind capacity, as well as, 
for example, the ideas and affects associated with sounds via various exercises, 
Deep Listening aims to facilitate a greater understanding of the relations between 
the ear, the body, the physicality of sound, its perception and environment. Oliveros 
describes it as a process of ‘exploring the relationships among any and all sounds 
whether natural or technological, intended or unintended, real, remembered, or 
imaginary. Thought is included.’29 Deep Listening aims to develop balance between 
‘focal listening’, which concentrates on the specificities of particular sounds and 
‘global listening’ which diverts attention to the broader, composite field of sound. 
By placing focal listening in relation to global listening; and by placing the 
specificities of an individual sound in relation to a broader context, Deep Listening 
can be understood as fostering a move from inadequate to adequate ideas: from a 
reflection on how sounds appear to us, towards understanding sounds are 
determined by and situated within a broader network of relations. Rather than 
figuring it as a passive and homogenous sense, Oliveros practice thus reveals 
listening as multiple, complex and variable.  
 
It might be tempting to read Oliveros as advocating the mind gaining control over 
the body and the sensations, inasmuch as her aforementioned distinction between 
‘hearing’ and ‘listening’ would appear to reproduce a Cartesian dualism: where 
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hearing involves the physical and unconscious dimensions of perception, listening 
pertains to its psychological and conscious components and its social and cultural 
attachments. This tension is not easily resolved. However, it is notable that Deep 
Listening does not pertain to a mastering of listening via consciousness.30 Rather, it 
is about understanding and experimenting with the listener’s own sensuous capacity 
in relation to its environment, of which it is a part. Oliveros writes about her 
development of her practice as such:  
‘I noticed that many musicians were not listening to what they were 
performing! There was good hand eye co-ordination in reading music, but 
listening was not necessarily part of the performance. The musician was of 
course hearing but listening all over or attention to the space/time 
continuum (global) was not happening. There was disconnection from the 
environment that included the audience as the music was played…. I 
began with myself. I started to sing and play long tones, and to listen and 
observe how these tones affected me mentally and physically. I noticed 
that I could change my emotional state by concentrating my attention on a 
tone. I noticed that I could feel my body responding with relaxation or 
tension. Prolonged practice brought about a heightened state of awareness 
that gave me a sense of well-being.’31 
Oliveros’ comments on Deep listening resonate with Lloyd’s observation that 
self-awareness is not about directing attention to an external intellectual 
object, independent of sensory and corporeal experience. Rather, it is a 
refining of the sensory awareness of the body. For Oliveros, the body and its 
affections are integral to the process of Deep Listening, insofar as they serve 
to situate knowledge and understanding: change relies not just on words but 
on ‘a full body response that has total presence and impact. That does not 
mean that words are not effective… Without engagement of the body though, 
words are literally disembodied and become more and more abstract.”32   
 
If the ‘good’ in Spinoza involves developing an awareness and understanding 
of what a body can and cannot do via its relations with other bodies, then 
Oliveros’ experimental practice of deep listening can be thought of as seeking 
empowerment through generating awareness of the affective and ideational 
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relations between listening body, its mind and sound. It requires listeners to 
recognise themselves not as disconnected actors but as part of a broader 
whole, within which we can become knowing and thus active in our 
engagements. Indeed, it is pertinent that Oliveros recognises Deep Listening 
as an ethical project, arising from ‘feeling that people needed connections, 
interconnections, rather than separation in order to play together well for one 
thing (as musicians), but also to be together well as human beings on a planet 
that is shared by all….I recognized that being heard was a step toward being 
understood. Being understood is a step toward being healed. Understanding is 
a step toward building community.’33 For Oliveros, the understanding 
fostered by Deep Listening of the self and its relations has the potential to 
help generate peace: ‘The more deep listeners we have, the better chance of 
having a peaceful society. Deep listening is part of a personal, and now 
communal, quest for peace.’34  Through playful experimentation with and a 
refinement of the body and its minds’ power to listen, Deep Listening can be 
understood to pursue a shared and reasoned joy.  
 
Spinozist auralidiversity   
Oliveros’ practice seeks to distribute sonic experience across the body and bodies, 
expanding the realm of listening to include, for example, the feet and eyebrows.35 
Nonetheless, Deep Listening, and the ethical project embedded within it, tends to 
rely upon a body’s capacity for hearing. Consequently, the enrichment and 
refinement of social, musical and ethical listening rests, in part, on a body’s capacity 
to be aurally affected. If a complex network of relations constitutes music’s 
affective and ideational power, then it remains to be asked how the capacities of 
listening bodies, alongside, for example, musical materials, social contexts and 
distribution technologies determine these powers. In other words, how does a 
Spinozist account of musical power take into account ‘auraldiversity’? This term 
has been used by John levack Drever to refer to a ‘variety of  (often less than ideal 
hearing that we experience throughout a normal day and throughout our lives albeit 
to varying degrees (from the trifling experience of a temporary threshold shift or 
transient ear noise to intolerable pain from hypercausis).’36 To consider 
auraldiversity is to recognise that capacities for hearing varies not only between 
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different individuals but also the same individual might experience different hearing 
capacities at different stages of their life.  
 
The differences between listening bodies are central to Spinoza’s remark on music. 
Where the bodily and ideational states of grief and melancholy condition music’s 
affective power, the deaf body, for Spinoza remains unaffected: music is neither 
good nor bad inasmuch as the deaf listener is assumed to not have the capacity to 
perceive it. While his characterization of deaf musical experience is rather 
reductive, Spinoza’s acknowledgement of deafness as one of a number of bodily 
states that inform perceptions of music is nonetheless striking. As has already noted, 
different bodies have different powers. What a melancholic body can and cannot do, 
what a grieving body can and cannot do and what a deaf body can and cannot do are 
different. However, the comparisons of different body’s powers tell us nothing 
about their ontology. In the preface to Part IV of The Ethics, immediately prior to 
his remark on music, Spinoza argues that perfection and imperfection are only 
‘modes of thinking’, that is, ‘notions we are accustomed to feign because we 
compare individuals of the same species or genus to one another.’ Similarly, 
changes in a body’s capacity to hear do not mark a change in a body’s perfection. 
When experiencing a heavy cold, a virus diminishes my body’s power for thought 
and action. One consequence of this bad encounter is that my capacity for hearing is 
diminished by comparison to the week prior. And yet it is only by comparison to my 
previous experiences that I might describe my hearing as ‘imperfect’. The 
‘imperfection’ of my hearing arises from an idea of my own hearing, rather than any 
imperfection of my body.  In other words, a deaf body’s ‘diminished’ capacity for 
hearing music is only judged as such relative to an ideal or norm. This is not to deny 
that such ideals or norms can be powerful; nor that deaf bodies are negatively 
affected by audism or other discriminatory structures. However, as bodies and their 
minds are modes of one substance that is God/Nature, no body is more or less 
perfect than any other. 
 
Just as an individuals capacity for hearing may vary over the course of a day, week 
or lifetime, what deaf bodies can or cannot do in relation to sonic bodies varies. In 
assuming deaf bodies remain unaffected by music – which is to say, music has no 
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power in relation to them – Spinoza’s comment can be understood to reiterate a 
dominant imagination or ‘ideal type’ of deafness that downplays the continuums 
between and multiplicities of sensory capacities.37 This imagination of deaf 
experience in relation to sound and music has been challenged by a variety of 
practitioners:  American artist Christine Sun Kim has sought to reconfigure limited 
conceptions of sonic experience, deafness and and hearing in her work. Sun Kim, 
who is pre-linguistically deaf, does not consider herself a musician and although 
sound is her primary medium, her practice draws upon a number of mediums, 
including painting, writing, performance and video installation. However, in doing 
so, it raises questions about the boundaries of the aural in relation to different 
‘sonic’ practices, including music. Sun Kim has described her practice as being 
motivated by ‘unlearning sound etiquette.’38 Her work interrogates the conventions 
through which hearing people perceive and react to sound, as well as her own learnt 
responses to sound. She describes her art as ‘exploring what is possible and what is 
not, pushing and redefining boundaries.’39 In Sun Kim’s face opera ii, for instance, 
deaf participants ‘sing’ via facial expressions and visual nuances. Drawing 
inspiration from the integral role of body movement in American Sign Language 
communication, the performance makes apparent processes of bodily translation, 
with the ‘choir’ responding to a conductor. Likewise, Sun Kim’s use of musical 
notation in her drawings makes apparent the ways in which visual media can 
communicate sonic information. In drawing attention to processes of mediation and 
translation, Sun Kim’s work not only unsettles the boundaries between ‘hearing 
culture’ and ‘deaf culture’ but also aural and the visual. In the context of Sun Kim’s 
work, the complexity of musical bodies comes to the fore: music’s affects – as a 
‘sonic’ medium - concern not just sound but movement, visuals and haptic 
vibration. Different listening bodies, meanwhile, might be affected by some, if not 
all, of these components.     
 
In spite of his reassertion of deafness as an ideal type, Spinoza’s acknowledgement 
of deaf encounters with music and his monist ontology offers a possible departure 
from a model of musical power predicated on an ‘ideal listener’. This ideal listener 
has been integral to what was previously described as aesthetic moralism. Analyses 
of music in both music studies and philosophy tend to assume a particular type of 
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engagement with music: it is often posited as the sole or primary point of focus to 
an attentive listener, who is, in turn, positively affected. The often-implicit assertion 
of an ideal listener results in a marginalisation of everyday, ‘inattentive’ and 
negative encounters with music. Moreover, this ideal listener also tends to fail to 
account for auraldiverse encounters with music, which to greater or lesser degrees 
may be affected by music as a sonic medium. Spinoza’s remark on music, however, 
makes apparent the simple yet important point that different bodies are differently 
affected: the nature of their affection and the degree to which they affected emerges 
in situ. To acknowledge this does not require a return to relativism, whereby 
music’s effects are entirely subjective. Indeed, as has already been noted, Spinoza’s 
work allows for an alternative trajectory inasmuch as a body and its powers exist 
within a nexus of relations. Nor does it necessarily require a departure from 
generalisations about sonic experience: for most hearing human bodies, for 
example, the deployment of music at high volumes at indeterminate intervals and 
for long durations while being held at a detention camp would be a deeply 
unpleasant and diminishing experience, irrespective of ethnicity, religion and 
personal taste. Yet Spinoza’s ontology, in asserting that no mode is more or less 
perfect than another mode; and asserting that what a body and its mind can do 
cannot be known in advance, means that conceptualisations of musical experience 
predicated on generalisations of affective and ideational responses need to remain 
open to revision. They are partial, relative and situated.  
 
Conclusion: from aesthetic moralism to ethical ambivalence  
Spinoza offers little by way of comment on musical experience. Indeed, for 
Spinoza, there is nothing ‘special’ about music: it cannot be substantially 
distinguished from any other entity. In this regard, speaking of musical power, or 
sonic materiality is, ontologically speaking, meaningless. For many musicologists, 
the lack of ‘specialness’ afforded to music might be a cause for concern, inasmuch 
as music studies tends to assume that music is special and qualitatively different 
from other artforms and activities. In spite of this, there is much in Spinoza’s work 
that resonates with contemporary music studies. The Spinozist emphasis on bodies, 
affects, powers and relations provide useful tools for conceptualising encounters 
with music - as listeners, performers, producers, communities or otherwise. 
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A Spinozist account of musical power recognises music’s affects and effects to 
emerge in situ. Where music studies has often framed ‘the power of music’ in 
positive terms – for instance, its capacity to provide emotional comfort, intellectual 
stimulus, or friendship  – A Spinozist framework allows space for musical 
experiences to be mundane, negative and damaging. Music might result in reasoned 
joy by aiding ‘self-awareness’ of the body and its mind’s power. However, it can 
also result in a diminishment or limitation of power – be it by causing physical and 
psychological harm, or by reinforcing dominant social imaginations. Furthermore, 
where music studies and philosophy have often based their assessments of music on 
an ‘ideal listener’, a Spinozist ontology offers a means of departing from such 
models: the simple yet important point that is made apparent by his brief comment 
on music is that different bodies have different capacities to be affected – aurally or 
otherwise. Spinoza thus makes space for music’s ethico-affective ambivalence, 
contra dominant musicological fictions and their underlying ‘aesthetic moralisms’. 
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